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Issue Number 59, dated 6/7/99

Tehran uses PKK to split Iraqi opposition. (Serial 5901)

 

The Iranian government has stepped up its support for the KurdishWorkers Party of Turkey (PKK), and is now hosting an estimated 6,000to 10,000 PKK fighters on Iranian soil, Kurdish sources in northernIraq told The Iran Brief. That is a dramatic increase in the numberof PKK fighters on Iranian soil, which the Turkish government hadpreviously estimated at just a few hundred.

With the arrest of PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan on February 15 inKenya, thousands of PKK fighters flocked to Iran from Syria, Iraq,and Turkey, to rally to the leadership of his younger brother, Osman."If Abdallah Ocalan was seen as the creation of Syria, Osman Ocalanis an Iranian agent," a Kurdish source told The Iran Brief.

More PKK fighters fled into Iran in mid April, when the Turkisharmy launched a major ground and air campaign against PKK bases innorthern Iraq. Since then, the Iranian government has opened as manyas thirty new training camps for PKK fighters, according to leakedTurkish intelligence reports. "The PKK is alive and kicking and hasregional benefactors who will not let it die," another Kurdish sourcesaid.

Direct sponsorship: Only two weeks after Abdallah Ocalan'scapture, the Iranian government sponsored the PKK's 6th PartyCongress in the northwestern Iranian city of Urumieh, followingwidespread demonstrations through Iranian Kurdish areas in Ocalan'sfavor ["Clashes reported in Sanandaj," TIB 3/8/99] . TheIranian-backed conference enshrined Osman (aka Ferhat) Ocalan as PKKleader, at the head of a five member Executive Committee. Othermembers were Cemil Bayik, a rival PKK military leader, FaysalDunlayici (aka Kani Yilmaz), Rothgar Althur, and Mustapha Aglo.

The conference location was obviously sensitive. A spokesman forthe PKK's political wing, Karadas Ender, told AFP on March 4 that ithad been held in PKK-controlled territory in "northern Kurdistan"(AFP interpreted that to mean Turkey), while the official Iranianpress agency claimed in a March 10 report that it had been held inParis. In fact, both Cemil Bayik and Osman Ocalan were quoted by thePKK's own news agency, MED-TV, in reports from northern Iran as theconference began.

In recent months, the Iranian intelligence services have activelyrecruited local Kurds in northern Iran to carry out PKK terroristattacks, Kurdish sources told The Iran Brief. In one such instance, awoman laden with explosives crossed the border from Iran on March 4and blew herself up in front of a police station in Batman, Turkey.Although the PKK claimed responsibility for the attack, IranianKurdish sources said the woman was actually an Iranian Kurd, and hadbeen recruited and trained by Iranian intelligence for the job.

Attacks inside Iraq: Since the 6th Congress, the Turkish press hasreported extensively on an escalation of Iranian support for the PKK,both past and present.

In one leaked account of Abdallah Ocalan's deposition to Turkishprosecutors, the former PKK leader reportedly described purchasingSerbian-built Strella anti-aircraft missiles that were delivered to aPKK camp in northern Iraq through Armenia. Iranian intelligence"acted as an intermediary for weapons deliveries to the PKK throughthe Caucuses," he reportedly said.

On March 31, after capturing some 400 members of the TurkishHezbollah movement, which is backed by Iran, the Turkish governmenttold reporters that Hezbollah operations against the Turkishgovernment were "being coordinated with the PKK."

Turkish television reported on the stepped up ties between thePKK and the Iranian regime on May 10, when NTV news revealed thatOsman Ocalan had taken refuge in Iran along with some 2,000 PKKfighters, following the Turkish army crackdown on PKK bases in Iraqthree weeks earlier. That figure now appears to be conservative. NTVsaid that Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps was providing the PKKrebels with arms and logistic aid.

In May, PKK fighters launched several attacks in northern Iraq inareas under the control of the Kurdish Democratic Party, one of thefounding members of the opposition Iraqi National Congress. The KDPblamed the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan for allowing the PKK toestablish staging areas in territory along the Iranian border underPUK control. The PUK fiercely denied the charges.

On May 13, PKK fighters crossed the demarcation line separatingthe PUK and KDP in northern Iraq, and attacked a group of twelveteenage boys said to be gathering herbs in the mountains near thevillage of Baze, in Irbil province. The PKK fighters eventuallyreleased eight of the teenagers, according to a KDP statement, buthorribly mutilated the other four in an effort "to intimidate thelocal population." All four were beheaded, their limbs broken, andtheir eyes gouged out. (A separate statement from the KurdishRevolutionary Hezbollah Party in Iraq said the eight youths who werereleased had convinced their PKK abductors that they were Hezbollahparty members, giving further credence to the Hezbollah-PKK-Iranties).

A second round of attacks took place two weeks later, during thenight of May 24-25. This time, the PKK fighters flocked across theborder from Iran and through PUK areas in cars, not on foot, showinga new level of Iranian government support, the KDP said. Theyattacked six separate villages in the region south of Chomran nearthe Iranian border.

KDP officials said they feared the recent attacks were only thebeginning, and that the Iranian government, in conjunction with Iraq,would once again use the PKK to set off a new round of fightingbetween the rival Iraqi Kurdish groups in northern Iraq that wouldundermine if not destroy the Iraqi opposition. Iraq is alsosponsoring the PKK, and has openly established training camps forthem on its side of the ceasefire line bordering the Kurdish areas,at Shehan and in Makhmoor. The Iraqi government presents them as apro-government Iraqi Kurdish militia.

In late 1997, the PKK launched more than a dozen attacks againstthe KDP from PUK territory - again, with Iranian assistance. Thoseattacks led to intensive fighting between the KDP and the PUK thatbroke out on Oct. 13, 1997.

Spokesmen in Washington for both the KDP and the PUK said theirleadership was determined to avoid a repeat of the 1997 debacle, andsought to apply the terms of the September 1998 Washington accordestablishing zones of influence for each group.

The PUK flatly denied the KDP charges that it had helped the PKKor the Iranians to stage the attacks last month in a statementreleased on June 2, noting that "a joint PUK-KDP commissionestablished under the auspices of the Washington Accord is currentlyinvestigating the incident."

The road to Tehran: Iran's long-term goals remain unclear.Newspaper editorials, which tend to reflect conflicting viewpointswithin the government, alternate between advocating the overthrow ofSaddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, to condemning such action as anAmerican plot. Some even see the continuation of a weak Saddam as thekey to stable relations between Iran and Iraq.

But Tehran's short-term tactics are unequivocal: it is seeking togain as much leverage as possible over the Iraqi opposition, for theday when the regime determines which strategy to pursue.

Over the past four weeks, representatives from all the major Iraqiopposition groups have taken the road to Tehran, alternately seekingIranian assistance, Iranian acquiescence, or Iranian neutrality.

PUK leader Jalal Talabani was the first, arriving in Tehran at theend of April and leaving on May 10, just three days before the PKKattacks were launched from his territory against the KDP. Talabanisaid he had been seeking Iranian assistance in the PUK's struggleagainst Saddam Hussein, and that he had brought Tehran a message fromWashington. "Washington told some governments in the region that 1999would be the year of change in Iraq," he told the London-based Saudiweekly, Al Hayat.

Sources close to Talabani said they had detected a new tone inTehran, and that senior Iranian government officials "are becomingconvinced that the U.S. is finally getting serious about getting ridof Saddam." Iran's goal is to prevent the emergence of a hostileIraq, the sources said. "There is a growing realization that SaddamHussein could be forced out, one way or another."

A KDP delegation, headed by Nichivan Barzani, nephew of MassoudBarzani and head of the KDP's military branch, arrived in Tehran onMay 27. Barzani was accompanied by two other KDP politburo members,Fadel Mirani and Azad Berwadi. A KDP representative said they plannedto bring up Iran's support for the PKK, and that they were respondingto an Iranian invitation. KDP leader Massoud Barzani and his familyhave extensive real estate holdings in Tehran and elsewhere inIran.

Also traveling to Tehran in May was former INC chairman AhmadChalabi, now a member of the group's seven-man Executive Committee.Chalabi said in Washington after his return that he held extensivetalks with Iranian government officials and with Ayatollah BakrHakim, leader of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Republic of Iraq(SCIRI), a founding member of the INC coalition.

Some Iraqi opposition sources say the Iranians prohibited SCIRIfrom taking part in the INC delegation that came to Washington lastmonth and met with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the StateDepartment on May 24. But Chalabi said that was not so. "The Iranianssay they have real differences with the U.S., but at the same timethey see a real change in the U.S. position toward getting rid ofSaddam Hussein, which they support."

Chalabi said the reason SCIRI did not join the INC delegation toWashington was for fear of Iraqi retaliation. "Their refusal was notnegative, or frivolous," he said. "SCIRI wants to participate. Butthey are worried that Saddam Hussein will retaliate against thepeople of the south. They want a U.S. statement of protection, andthey think that by holding back from participating they have a betterchance of getting it."

Specifically, Chalabi said SCIRI wanted a U.S. pledge to enforce a"no-drive zone" in southern Iraq, to prevent the Iraqi army fromdeploying tanks and armored vehicles against the Shia resistance.

Iraqi Kurdish leaders said they also feared Iraqi retaliationagainst their civilian population, and wanted similar guarantees.