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Radical supporters of the dominant Jameh-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez faction (Militant Clerics Society) won an overwhelming majority in the Assembly of Experts elections held on Oct. 23, winning 69 out of the total 86 seats. The Assembly's sole duty is to elect the Supreme Leader.
Reformers and Western analysts had looked to the election as a test of the popularity of President Khatami, who has identified himself with the reformers, but the radicals stacked the deck from the start by disbarring reformers from running. The reformers are led by former Tehran mayor Gholamreza Karbaschi and his Servants of Reconstruction party. Despite losing the possibility to run candidates in many districts, Karbaschi nevertheless called on Khatami supporters to vote.
In Iran's controlled elections, it is not always the outcome that is the most important gauge of popular opinion, but turnout. In this case, the regime took great pains to emphasize high voter turnout, extending poll closing time twice to accommodate "crowds" of would-be voters. But Western reporters who toured polling places in Tehran and telephoned people at provincial polling places reported few voters at any of the polling places they surveyed. The opposition People's Mujahedin claimed that no more than 4 million people voted - around 10 percent of eligible voters - while the regime claimed that 17.8 million cast their votes. This compares to the regime figure of 29 million Iranians who cast ballots last year in the presidential race won by Hojjat-ol eslam Mohammad Khatami.
Some radical clerical leaders urged the regime to abandon its effort to appear legitimate in Western eyes by urging people to vote. Majlis speaker Nateq-Nouri, who was the regime's candidate against Khatami last year, put it succinctly: "Our regime gets its legitimacy from God," he said. "The legitimacy of the regime does not lie with the people. Those who say the legitimacy of the leader depends on his popularity do not understand."
Reformers and their Western supporters had put out the rumor that a Reformer victory in the Assembly of Experts election could herald a change in the structure of the Islamic Republic, perhaps a reduction in the power of the Supreme Leader, who is not elected by popular vote. Alternately, it was suggested that reformers might vote to depose Khamene'i, whose religious credentials have been challenged, replacing him with a more traditional cleric who would eschew politics and stick to religious and moral issues.
Liberal bias: In the West, most analysts refer to President Khatami and his Reformers as "moderates," and to Khamene'i's faction as "conservatives." These are Western terms, chosen by a liberal press and by pro-regime academics, in an effort to generate support for Khatami (and before him, for Rafsanjani, who founded the Reform movement as a means of creating a personal power base).
In fact, Khamene'i and his faction are no more "conservative" than Joseph Stalin. Determined advocates of "national liberation" struggles against Western domination, an old saw of the radical left, Khamene'i and his faction are also believers in a state-controlled economy, which is anathema to conservatives around the world. As for Khatami, he is seeking like Khruschev and Gorbachev to reform the Islamic Republic without changing its underlying ideology. The last thing he wants is to abandon clerical rule. (He also happens to be a believer in a command economy).
While anything could happen within the raucous conclave of Iran's radical clergy, it is highly unlikely that the Assembly of Experts, which only meets to elect the Leader, will be the driving force in making constitutional or regime changes since no opponents of the Velayat-e faghih - the doctrine of clerical rule - were allowed to stand for election.
The most outspoken advocate of this position is the lay philosopher Abdelkarim Soroush. But many clerics also support the movement of removing the clergy from positions of political power; most of them, such as Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Rouhani, who died in July 1997, have been under house arrest for years.
This is the only faction that could be deemed "moderate" in the sense that they are preaching a return to normality in Iran; however, the culture mavens of the Left would find them to be true conservatives, advocates of market economics and "traditional values." In the meantime, we believe the terms "radical" and "reformer" and a more accurate description of the dominant factions within the Islamic Republic elite.