111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R.

To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, require the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on ________

A BILL

To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, require the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Peace Through Strength Act of 2009”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
(a) IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.—Congress finds the following:

(1) On October 25, 2007 the Secretary of the Treasury designated under Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to designating and blocking assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism) the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organization and Iran’s state-owned Back Saderat as a terrorist financier.

(2) In the 2008 Department of State Country Report, the Secretary of State determined that of all state sponsors of terrorism, the Government of Iran is the most active sponsor of terrorism, threatening peace in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

(3) According to the State Department, despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, the Government of Iran continues to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, and guid-
ance, to Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition and Iraqi forces and kill innocent Iraqi civilians.

(4) Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper rifles, automatic weapons, explosively formed penetrators, and mortars have killed Iraqi and Coalition Forces as well as civilians.

(5) Iran has aided and abetted groups certified by the United States Government as foreign terrorist organizations for nearly 3 decades, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

(6) In April 2008 the Commanding General Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David H. Petraeus, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that Iran has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging way, through its lethal support to the “special groups” operating against coalition forces in Iraq.

(7) United States Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, testified in April 2008 that Iran continues to undermine the efforts of the Government of Iraq to establish a stable, secure state by training criminal militia elements engaged in violence against Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civilians.
(8) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General Michael V. Hayden, stated on May 30, 2008, that “It is the policy of the Iranian government, approved at the highest levels of that government, to facilitate the killing of American and other coalition forces in Iraq. Period.”.

(9) The Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, stated in his March 10, 2009 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Iran continues to provide money, weapons and training to some Iraqi Shia militants despite pledges by senior Iranian officials to stop such support. The weapons include Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-controlled, remote arming and passive infrared detonators, mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, small arms ammunition and explosives.”.

(b) Iran’s ballistic missile fleet developments and testing.—Congress finds the following:

(1) The Government of Iran continues to enhance the capabilities of its ballistic missile fleet, holding United States interest in Southern Europe, the Persian Gulf region, and South Asia at risk of an attack.
(2) In September 2004, the Government of Iran showed off its range of ballistic missiles at an annual military parade, with the rockets draped in banners vowing to “crush America” and “wipe Israel off the map”.

(3) On October 25, 2007, the Secretary of State designated under Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) two key Iranian entities of missile proliferation concern, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury designated under Executive Order 13382 for proliferation activities nine IRGC-affiliated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as derivatives of the IRGC, Iran’s state-owned Banks Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated with Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization.

(4) The IRGC has been outspoken about its willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

(5) The IRGC’s ballistic missile inventory includes missiles which could be modified to deliver weapons of mass destruction. The IRGC is one of
the primary organizations of the Iranian regime tied
to developing and testing the Shahab–3 missile. The
IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure so-
phisticated and costly equipment that could be used
to support Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear pro-
grams.

(6) Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier General
Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, has stated that one of
the major projects of the Iranian Ministry of De-
fense and Armed Forces Logistics is the manufac-
turing of Shahab–3 missiles, and that this project
will not be halted.

(7) Michael McConnell, then Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed
Services Committee February 27, 2009, “Iran con-
tinues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable
of delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer-
range missiles. I note again that two activities rel-
vant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: ura-
nium enrichment that will enable the production of
fissile material and development of long-range bal-
listic missile systems.”.

(8) Iran test-fired nine long-range and medium
range missiles on July 9, 2008, and according to
Iranian state television, one of the missile systems
was the Shahab–3, capable of striking Israel.

(9) Iran currently possesses short-range bal-
listic missiles (SRBM), as well as medium-range bal-
listic missiles (MRBM), capable of reaching much of
the Middle East region, including Israel, and reach-
ing Turkey.

(10) On April 5, 2009, the President Barack
Obama said, “So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and
ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just
to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and
our allies.”.

(11) On February 3, 2009, the Government of
Iran successfully launched its first satellite into
orbit—an act in direct violation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1737, limiting Iran from
missile activity.

(12) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in March 2009, “Space launch
technology is no different from military technology,
and the Safir launch last month shows that Iran is
mastering the use of ballistic weapons.”.

(13) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in March 2009, “Militarily, Iran continues to strengthen the three pillars of its strategic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; naval forces to disrupt maritime traffic through key waterways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many of their statements are exaggerations, Iranian officials throughout the past year have repeatedly claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that could threaten United States and allied interests.”

(14) General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, “Iran’s February 3, 2009 launch of the Safir space launch vehicle shows progress in mastering technology needed to produce ICBMs.”

(15) On May 19, 2009, the Government of Iran test-fired a new two-stage, medium-range, solid fuel, surface-to-surface missile, claiming it can span the entire nation of Israel and United States forces deployed in the Persian Gulf Region.

(e) IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—Congress finds the following:
(1) An Iranian Government armed with nuclear weapons would be significantly destabilizing to the Middle East region, placing United States interests at grave risk, and inspiring regional proliferation to counter-balance an Iranian nuclear-strike capability.

(2) An Iranian Government equipped with nuclear weapons could have a far greater ability to quash domestic dissent with little fear of national intervention, hereby dimming prospects for internal democratic transformation within Iran.

(3) The Government of Iran is actively developing the means to indigenously produce enriched uranium, a necessary element to develop a nuclear weapons capability, and has resisted international calls for transparency and accountability measures that would build confidence in the proclaimed peaceful intent of Iran’s nuclear program.

(4) On February 5, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence testified before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that “Declared uranium enrichment efforts, which will enable the production of fissile material, continue. This is the most difficult challenge in nuclear production. Iran’s efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach North Africa and Europe also continue.”
(5) In March 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in referring to United States allies, the Czech Republic and Poland, said “They recognize there is a real potential future threat, that missiles not only with a nuclear warhead, but with a conventional warhead or some other chemical or biological weapon could very well be in the hands of a regime like Iran’s, which we know will use whatever advantage they have to intimidate as far as they think their voice can reach.”

(6) On April 6, 2009, the President Barack Obama stated, “The peace of the region will also be advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambitions.”

(7) According to Israeli Defense estimates, Tehran is believed to currently have an arsenal of 100–200 long-range Shahab missiles that have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers and carry up to one-ton warheads.

(8) According to Israeli Defense estimates, it is the Government of Iran’s plan to obtain 500 missile launchers and over 1,000 missiles with a range of 2,500 km. by 2015.

(9) On May 18, 2009, the President Barack Obama claimed, “the Islamic Republic’s obtaining a
nuclear weapon would be not only a threat to Israel
and the United States, but ‘profoundly destabilizing’
to the international community in general’.

(10) On May 18, 2009 while meeting with the
President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister
Benyamin Netanyahu said, “[A nuclear Iran] could
give the nuclear umbrella to terrorists or worse, it
could actually give nuclear weapons to terrorists I
believe it would put all of us in great peril.” Iran’s
obtaining nuclear weapons would be an existential
threat not only to Israel but the rest of the world.

(11) According to the IAEA, Iran has installed
2 or 3 types of next-generation centrifuges at
Natanz FEP, including IR–2 and the IR–3.

(12) On March 17, 2009, British Prime Min-
ister Gordon Brown states, “[L]et me be equally
clear that Iran’s current nuclear program is unac-
ceptable. Iran has concealed nuclear activities, re-
fused to cooperate with the IAEA, and flouted
United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Its re-
fusal to play by the rules leads us to view its nuclear
program as a critical proliferation threat. Iran there-
fore faces a clear choice—continue in this way and
face further and tougher sanctions, or change to a
United Nations overseen civil nuclear energy pro-
gram that will bring the greatest benefits to its citi-
zens.”.

(13) An International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report released on June 5, 2009 confirmed
that the number of centrifuges enriching uranium at
the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has in-
creased to 4,920 (up from 3,936) with an additional
2,132 installed and operating under vacuum. This
brings the total number of centrifuges either enrich-
ing uranium or installed and ready to begin enrich-
ment to 7,052.

(14) On July 8, 2009, Chairman of the Joint
Chief of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen stated, the
“window is closing” for preventing Iran from acquir-
ing a nuclear weapon. He continues saying, “Iran is
very focused on developing this capability and the
clock is ticking and that’s why I’m as concerned as
I am.”.

(15) On September 25, 2009 it was announced
that Iran possessed a covert uranium enrichment fa-
cility along a road leading to the city of Qom.

(16) On September 30, 2009 Iran’s nuclear
chief Ali Akbar Salehi said, “The [Qom] facility was
built inside a mountain next to a military compound
of the Revolutionary Guard, and is equipped with air
defense systems.”. He openly expressed this will ensure continuity of its nuclear activities in case of an attack.

(17) British Prime Minister Gordon Brown commented on the Iranian nuclear facility at Qom saying, “this is clear evidence of Iran’s serial deception. The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful programme. Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow—endangering the nonproliferation regime, denying its people access to the opportunity they deserve, and threatening the stability and security of the region and the world.”.

(18) Prime Minister Netanyahu called Iran “the major terrorist-sponsoring state of our time”. He says, “that Tehran could give those nuclear weapons to terrorists or give them a nuclear umbrella that would bring terrorism beyond our wildest dreams”.

(19) In September 2009, it was reported Iran is helping to detect uranium deposits in Venezuela. Iran’s Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said “Iran has been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and that evaluations indicate the existence of uranium in
western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de Uairen”. Sanz told reporters of this discovery, “We could have important reserves of uranium.”.

(20) Department of State spokesman Ian Kelly said recently that United States officials also have “concerns” about a possible transfer of nuclear materials between Iran and Venezuela.

(d) U.S. THREAT OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK.—Congress finds the following:

(1) According to the EMP Commission, a single nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude above the United States will produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).

(2) According to the EMP Commission, an EMP attack would disrupt electrical power necessary to support other critical infrastructures, including supply and distribution of water, food, fuel, communications, transport, financial transactions, emergency services, government services, and all other infrastructures supporting the national economy and welfare. If significant parts of the electrical power infrastructure are lost for any substantial period of time, the Commission believes that the consequences are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may ultimately die for lack of the basic elements nec-
(3) The EMP Commission stated in its report that certain types of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons can be employed to generate potentially catastrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas, and designs for variants of such weapons may have been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century.

(4) According to the EMP Commission, China and Russia have considered limited nuclear attack options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack.

(5) The EMP Commission recognizes a determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of sophistication.

(6) Having already conducted tests from sea-based platforms, detonating warheads at the highest point of the missile trajectory, Iran is exploring a workable research program to deliver an EMP attack against its enemies.

(e) IRANIAN DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IMPORTS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Iran is OPEC’s largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia with a refining capacity of some 1.5 million barrels per day but still has to import
around one-third of its gasoline to meet domestic demand.

(2) Iran imports around 140,000 barrels per day of gasoline, most of which is shipped in 30,000–35,000 ton cargoes to the Mideast Gulf port of Bandar Abbas.

(3) An interruption or significant limiting of the supply of gasoline to Iran would considerably impact the Iranian economy.

(4) An international restriction of gasoline exports to Iran would significantly bolster current diplomatic initiatives.

(5) On June 4, 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama said, “we should work with Europe, Japan, and the Gulf states to find every avenue outside the United Nation to isolate the Iranian regime—from cutting off loan guarantees and expanding financial sanctions to banning the export of refined petroleum to Iran.”.

(6) On October 7, 2008, then-Senator Barack Obama said, “Iran right now imports gasoline...if we can prevent them from importing the gasoline that they need...that starts changing their cost-benefit analysis. That starts putting the squeeze on them.”.
(f) VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—Congress finds the following:

(1) Reports indicate the Government of Iran directed Iranian children to clear the minefields during the Iran-Iraq war, resulting in their deaths.

(2) The Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report of 2008 concluded that there was a continued deterioration of the Government of Iran’s extremely poor status regarding respect for religious freedom, and every year since 1999 the Department of State has designated Iran a “country of particular concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for its violations of religious freedom.

(3) The Department of State’s Human Rights Report of 2008 concluded the Government of Iran’s poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses.

(4) The Government of Iran severely limits citizens’ right to modify their government peacefully through free and fair elections.

(5) The Government of Iran carries out summary executions, including executions of minors, following trials that lack due process.
(6) Many arrests in Iran are carried out by plain-clothed officials who fail to identify themselves and who do not produce an official arrest warrant or state a reason for the arrest.

(7) On December 18, 2008, for the sixth consecutive year, the United Nation General Assembly adopted a resolution on Iran expressing “deep concern at ongoing systematic violations of human rights”.


(9) The Government of Iran takes away the rights of women in Iran, including their right to the freedoms of movement, association, thought, conscience, and religion, as well as freedom from coercion in matters or belief.

(10) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s denials of the Holocaust and statements calling for Israel to be “wiped off the map” have created a climate of fear among Iran’s Jewish community.

(11) The Government of Iran continues to abuse and torture detainees and prisoners, including
carrying out severe punishments such as amputations and floggings.

(12) On February 9, 2009, Malcolm Smart, Director of Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa programme said, “Thirty years on, some of the worst abuses of the Shah’s time—torture, executions and the suppression of legitimate dissent—are still being replicated in Iran, despite the efforts of the country’s growing and valiant community of human rights defenders.”.

(13) Christians, in particular Evangelicals and other Protestants, in Iran continue to be subject to harassment, arrests, close surveillance, and imprisonment, and many converts from Islam to Christianity have fled the country for fear of persecution.

(14) According to Amnesty International, people in Iran are still enduring a catalogue of human rights abuses, 30 years after the Islamic Revolution.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be policy of the United States to seek normalization of relations with Iran once the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The Government of Iran denounces the use of terrorism as a means to further political ends.
(2) The Government of Iran turns over to the United States Al Qaeda members known by the Government of Iran to be living in Iran.

(3) The Government of Iran stops providing material support to groups designated as terrorist organizations under United States law.

(4) The Government of Iran ceases support for the wounding and killing of United States and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(5) The Government of Iran dismantles its chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons programs and commits to combating the proliferation of such weapons.

(6) The Government of Iran ceases the development and testing of long range ballistic missiles.

(7) The Government of Iran respects the boundaries, sovereignty, and right to exist of its neighbors, including the State of Israel, and contributes positively toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

(8) The Government of Iran upholds and defends the human rights and civil liberties of its citizens.

(b) Policy on International Engagement.—

The United States shall take the following actions:
The United States shall cooperate with allies to employ all instruments of national power to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran.

(2) The United States may not compromise elements of national missile defense systems, or offensive strategic weapons in exchange for Russia putting pressure on Iran.

(3) The United States shall cooperate with allies to expeditiously deploy a missile defense system that is capable of intercepting Iranian short, medium, and long-range missiles aimed at the United States or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies.

(4) The United States shall support the right of Israel to protect itself and shall remain committed to the defense of Israel, including support of the development of a national missile defense shield for Israel to defeat missile and rocket attack.

SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996 AND RELATED PROVISIONS.

(a) EXPLANATION OF SANCTIONS TO REFINED PETROLEUM.—Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(g) United States Policy Toward Iran.—It shall be the policy of the United States to encourage foreign governments to—

“(1) direct state-owned entities to cease all investment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of refined petroleum resources to Iran; and

“(2) persuade, and, where possible, require private entities based in their territories to cease all investment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of refined petroleum resources to Iran.”.

(b) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of Petroleum Resources of Iran and Export of Refined Petroleum Resources to Iran.—Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:

“(a) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of Petroleum Resources of Iran.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection, made an investment of $20,000,000 or more (or any combination of invest-
ments of at least $5,000,000 each, which in the aggregate
equals or exceeds $20,000,000 in any 12-month period),
that directly and significantly contributed to the enhance-
ment of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of
Iran.”.

(e) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to De-
velopment of Weapons of Mass Destruction or
Other Military Capabilities.—Section 5(b) of the
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended to read as follows:

“(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to
Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction or
Other Military Capabilities.—The President shall
impose two or more of the sanctions described in para-
graphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President deter-
mines that a person has, on or after the date of the enact-
ment of the subsection, provided Iran with refined petro-
leum resources, engaged in an activity, including produc-
tion, brokerage, insurance, and tanker delivery services,
that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import refined
petroleum resources, or exported, transferred, or otherwise
provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other
items knowing that the provision of such goods, services,
technology, or other items would contribute materially to
the ability of Iran to—
“(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or
“(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.”.

(d) Sanctions With Respect to Importation or Exportation of Certain Goods or Services.—Section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) as subsections (d) through (g), respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(e) Sanctions With Respect to Importation or Exportation of Certain Goods or Services.—Except as provided in subsection (g), the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment of this subsection—

“(1) imported, or financed such importation of, any goods or services of Iranian origin, other than Iranian-origin publications and materials imported for news publications or news broadcast dissemination; or
“(2) exported to Iran, the Government of Iran, or to any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, or finances such exportation of, any goods or technology, other than goods for humanitarian purposes.”;

(3) in subsection (a), by striking “subsection (f)” and inserting “subsection (g)”;

(4) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (1) of this subsection—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsections (a) and (b)” and inserting “subsections (a), (b), and (c)”;

(B) in paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (a) or (b)” and inserting “subsection (a), (b), or (c)”;

(5) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1) of this subsection—

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking “subsection (a) or (b)” and inserting “subsection (a), (b), or (c)”;

(B) by adding at the end the following new sentence:

“The exceptions specified in this subsection shall not apply to the Iranian state broadcasting system, in-
including Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).”.

(c) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—Section 6(6) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by striking “The President”; and inserting the following new subparagraph:

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The President”;

(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

“(B) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President shall, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange by the sanctioned person.

“(C) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of the sanctioned person.

“(D) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The President shall, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, with-
drawal, transportation, importation, or export-
tation of, dealing in, or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or trans-
actions involving, any property in which the 
sanctioned person has any interest by any per-
son, or with respect to any property, subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States.”.

(f) WAIVER.—Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act 
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at 
the end the following new paragraph:

“(4) OVERSIGHT HEARINGS.—If the President 
exercises the waiver authority under this subsection, 
Congress shall, not later than 30 days after receipt 
of the report under paragraph (1), conduct oversight 
hearings with respect to the exercise of such waiver 
authority.”.

(g) CERTAIN BIANNUAL REPORTS.—Section 10 of 
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
sections:

“(d) BIANNUAL REPORTS ON REFINED PETROLEUM 
EXPORTS TO IRAN.—Not later than six months after the 
date of the enactment of this subsection and every six 
months thereafter, the President shall transmit to the ap-
appropriate congressional committees a report describing,
with respect to the preceding six-month period—

“(1) any person that has provided Iran with re-

fined petroleum resources, and the petroleum re-

sources so provided;

“(2) any activity, including production, broker-
age, insurance, and tanker delivery services, engaged

in that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import

refined petroleum resources;

“(3) any person that has provided Iran with

goods, services, or technology for refining petroleum,

and the goods, services, or technology so provided;

and

“(4) steps taken by the President to carry out

the policy set forth in section 4(g).

“(e) Biannual Reports on Political Leadership

and Other Individual and Business Inter-
est.—Not later than six months after the date of the

enactment of this subsection and every six months there-

after, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the

appropriate congressional committees a report that—

“(1) lists the top political leadership of Iran,

the individuals and corporate entities supporting

such political leadership, and the foreign trading
partners of such individuals and corporate entities;

and

“(2) establishes a list of key individuals and commercial entities associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the foreign trading partners of the IRGC.”.

SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OPTIONS FOR PREVENTING IRAN FROM DEVELOPING OR DEPLOYING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares that the United States is wholly capable, willing, and ready to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining or developing a nuclear weapons capability.

(b) DEVELOPMENT.—As part of a United States policy that uses all instruments of national power to prevent the Government of Iran from successfully developing nuclear weapons and the means to hold United States interests at risk with those weapons, the Secretary of Defense shall develop and maintain viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate a report describing the following regarding military options toward the Government of Iran:

(1) An update on Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile threat to include all ballistic missile testing conducted, the status of Iran’s ability to produce or acquire fissile material, and nuclear stockpile changes in the previous one year period.

(2) An outline of Department of Defense military options toward the Government of Iran to counter a nuclear ballistic missile threat.

(3) A readiness update on the status of forces used in the various military options.