^*The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.

The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a populist revolution toppled the monarchy. The Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and functions as the Chief of State. He is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, first elected in a popular vote in 1989 and reelected in 1993, is constitutionally barred from a third term. The Constitution provides for a 270-seat unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The Government seeks to ensure that public policy is consistent with its view of political and socio-religious values, but some serious differences exist within the leadership. The authoritarian government maintains its power through widespread repression and intimidation. The judiciary is subject to government and religious influence.

Several agencies share responsibility for internal security, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force established after the revolution and coequal with the regular military. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Hezbollahis or Basijis conduct vigilante actions. Both regular and paramilitary security forces commit numerous and serious human rights abuses.

Iran has a mixed economy. The Government owns the petroleum and utilities industries and the banks. Oil exports are the primary source of foreign exchange. The economy has not yet recovered from the disruptions of the 1979 revolution and the destruction from the Iran-Iraq war. Iran's isolation from international financial markets has decreased slightly, but remains a problem. Economic performance is adversely affected by corruption and government mismanagement. Unemployment in 1996 was estimated at 30 percent, and inflation was about 50 percent.

The Government's human rights record remains poor; there was no evidence of significant human rights improvement during the year. Systematic abuses include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of fair trials; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; and restriction of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement. The Government represses political dissidents and the ruling clerics effectively control the electoral process, thereby denying citizens the right to change their government. Women face legal and social discrimination, and the Government discriminates against minorities and restricts important worker rights. Although a lively debate on political, economic, and social issues occurred during the parliamentary election campaign this year, freedom of expression remained firmly under government control and became more severely restricted in the wake of the parliamentary elections. The Government closed several newspapers, disqualified candidates, barred speakers, and intimidated opposition gatherings by encouraging Hezbollahi attacks.

However, the Government did allow the first visit in 5 years of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran. Canadian Maurice Copithorne, the newly appointed Special Rapporteur, visited Iran from February 10 to 16. The Special Rapporteur heard credible reports of abuses including: Inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment; arbitrary arrests, imprisonments, and executions; unfair judicial practices; and disregard for freedom of expression and religion. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UNHRC Special Rapporteur reported that the Government was generally cooperative during their visits, However, the Government continues to deny the universality of human rights and attempts to discredit critics. For example, in one Iranian press report, the chief of Evin prison described human rights inspectors as "sick" people who filed misleading and untruthful reports. The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Religious Freedom and the U.N. Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression also traveled to Iran in 1996. In November the UNHRC continued the mandate of its Special Rapporteur.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Most executions in political trials amount to summary executions because basic procedural safeguards are lacking. In his 1995 report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions noted "the persistent allegations of violations of the right to life in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Although the domestic press stopped reporting most executions as of 1992, executions appear to continue in substantial numbers. Amnesty International (AI) reported that at least 110 persons were executed in 1996, a substantial increase over the previous year's total of 50 executions. Inhuman punishments are used in some cases, including two cases of stoning (see Section 1.c.). Those executed included Mehrdad Kalany, who was executed on June 22 on charges that included "meeting and talking" with Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the former U.N. Special Representative, and the delegation that accompanied him. Also on June 22, Ahmed Bakhtiari, a member of the Iranian People's Fedaian Organization (Minority), was executed on charges of participation in a terrorist group and terrorist operations, as well as other criminal charges. Rahman Radjabi Hamvand, a member of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, was executed on July 28. The charges against him stemmed from a complaint by a private individual that was later withdrawn. AI reported that Hedayatollah Zendehdel and Abolghasem Majd-Abkahi were believed to have been hanged at the end of the year, after 7 years' detention without trial and conviction on mainly political charges.

Exiles and human rights monitors report that many of those executed for alleged criminal offenses, primarily narcotics charges, were actually political dissidents. In addition a November 1995 law criminalized dissent and applied the death penalty to offenses such as "attempts against the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini, and against the Leader of the Islamic Republic."

The Government continued its repression of the Sunni minority, both inside and outside Iran. On January 28, a 50-year-old Sunni cleric, Molawi Ahamed Sayyad, imprisoned by the Government from 1990-95, disappeared at Bandar Abbas airport. His body was found in a suburb of the city on February 2. Allegedly, six members of the Revolutionary Guards arrested him at the airport; he is believed to have died in their custody. In early March, 46-year-old Molavi Abdul Malek, a Sunni cleric and Iranian Balouch leader, was reportedly killed by Iranian intelligence operatives in Karachi. Also reported killed in a related incident were Iranian Sunni Molavi Abdulmalek, the son of a prominent Iranian Sunni cleric, and Jamshid Zahi, another Iranian Sunni leader.

In December clashes erupted in Bakhtaran at a funeral after mourners accused the Government of killing Mohammad Rabil, a Sunni prayer leader. Officials said that Rabil died of a heart attack. It is unclear whether any persons were killed in the rioting.

The Government also continued to kill political opponents abroad. Opposition leaders Zahrah Rajabi and Abdul Ali Moradi were killed in Istanbul by agents of the Government on February 20. In Iraq eight members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran were killed by elements of the Revolutionary Guards. The victims were: Ghafour Mehdizadeh; Ali Amini; and Saddig Abdulahi, who were killed on December 27, 1995 in Koya; Usman Ruyan and Abubaker Rahimi, who were killed on December 30, 1995 in Arbil; Rahman Schabannajad and Ali Abdulah, who were killed on January 2 in Suleimanya; and Cheder Mahmudi, who was killed in November 1995 in Suleimanya. In May a former official from the Shah's regime, Reza Masluman, was killed in Paris. The murder is believed to have been ordered by the Government.

Investigations of state-sponsored terrorism abroad continued in 1996. For example the trial of Kazem Darabi, an Iranian charged with murdering four Iranian Kurdish dissidents in Berlin in 1992 allegedly under instructions from the Iranian Government, continued in Germany. In November the German prosecutor stated that Iranian Head of State Ayatollah Khameini and President Rafsanjani were responsible for the murders. Iran responded by threatening the German embassy in Tehran, the German judiciary, and political and economic ties with Germany. In France a French prosecutor accused Iranian chief of intelligence Ali Fallahian of ordering a killing, and in Germany a warrant was issued for Fallahian's arrest.

The Government took no action to repudiate the religious ruling (fatwa), or its related bounty, calling for the death of Salman Rushdie and anyone associated with publishing his book, "The Satanic Verses" (see Section 2.a.).

b. Disappearance

No reliable information is available on the number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest, many detainees are held incommunicado.

In early November, Faraj Sarkuhi, a magazine editor who had been critical of the Government, disappeared while traveling to Germany where his wife and children reside. His wife accused the Government of abducting him in Tehran. Sarkuhi reappeared in late December and held a press conference at the Tehran airport where he said that he had been in Germany but had not contacted his wife, with whom he was having problems. The German Government stated that he had not entered Germany, and the press speculated that the Government had forced Sarkuhi to give a false account of his whereabouts.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Credible reports indicate that security forces continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Common methods include suspension for long periods in contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, and, most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. A new law entered into force on July 10 that reinforces Islamic punishments such as flogging, stoning, amputations, and public executions. Two persons were stoned to death, while two others were executed after receiving lashes.

Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary confinement or denied adequate rations or medical care in order to force confessions. Female prisoners have reportedly been raped or otherwise tortured while in detention. In the past, prison guards have intimidated the family members of detainees and have sometimes tortured detainees in their presence. The UNHRC Special Rapporteur met privately with detainee Abbas Amir Entezam, a former deputy minister in the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. Amir Entezam reported that the conditions in Evin prison improved after 1989, but that political prisoners were still housed with violent criminals and denied regular family visits. Some prisoners, who met with former U.N. Special Representative Galindo Pohl during his last visit in 1991, complained of reprisals. Amir Entezam claimed that he was beaten so extensively that he lost the hearing in his left ear.

The Government does not permit unrestricted to imprisoned dissidents by human rights monitors. The U.N. Special Rapporteur was not able to see all the dissidents he asked to see.

In September 1994, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a report on "unresolved humanitarian issues" from the Iran-Iraq war. The ICRC noted that the Government failed to identify combatants killed in action and failed to exchange information on those killed or missing. The report criticized the Government for obstructing ICRC efforts to register and repatriate prisoners of war. Throughout 1996 the Governments of Iran and Iraq made little progress in resolving the issue of those missing in action.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Although the Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, there is reportedly no legal time limit on incommunicado detention, nor any judicial means to determine the legality of detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in local Revolutionary Guard offices.

The security forces often do not inform family members of a prisoner's welfare and location. Even if these circumstances are known, the prisoner still may be denied visits by family and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoner's death. Those that do receive such information may be forced to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.

Although the Government claimed to have released Abbas Amir Entezam early in 1996, he is still detained. Initially arrested in 1979 on charges of espionage and condemned to life in prison, he is now held in a "security house."

Adherents of the Baha'i faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of detaining a small number of Baha'is at any time.

The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents leave Iran because they feel threatened.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The traditional court system is not independent and is subject to government and religious influence.

Iran has two court systems: The traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses; and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, established in 1979 to try political offenses, narcotics crimes, and "crimes against God."

Many aspects of the prerevolution judicial system survive in the civil and criminal courts. For example defendants have the right to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury system. In the absence of postrevolution laws, the Government advises judges to base their decisions on Islamic law. These courts are not independent. The Revolutionary Courts may consider cases normally in the jurisdiction of the civil and criminal courts, and also may overturn their decisions. Assignment of cases to either system of courts appea>

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